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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






MARCEL ANTHONY BENT, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                                                                          
______________ 
 
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF 
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
(Agency No. A046-243-570) 
Immigration Judge:  Jeffrey Mankin 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 18, 2021 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.* 
 








* The Honorable William Byrd Traxler, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.   
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Marcel Anthony Bent petitions for review of a decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
denying his application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”).  We will dismiss the petition in part and deny the petition in 
part because:  (1) Bent was convicted of an aggravated felony and thus we lack 
jurisdiction to review factual findings related to his request for withholding of removal; 
(2) the IJ and BIA applied the correct legal standard in determining that his conviction 
was for a particularly serious crime, making him ineligible for withholding of removal; 
and (3) the denial of Bent’s CAT claim was supported by substantial evidence.  
I 
Bent, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States in 
December 1997 as a lawful permanent resident.  He was later indicted on several charges 
related to a racketeering enterprise involving drug trafficking, robbery, and murder, and 
he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit racketeering, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1962(d).  He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and three years’ 
supervised release.    
Thereafter, Bent received a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) in the Immigration Court.  
The NTA charged him with being subject to removal because he had been convicted of 
an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).    
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After the IJ sustained the charges of removability, Bent filed, among other things, 
an application for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT, arguing that he 
would face torture for his homosexuality if he returned to Jamaica.1  The IJ concluded 
that Bent’s aggravated felony conviction constituted a particularly serious crime, 
rendering him ineligible for withholding of removal.  The IJ also determined that Bent 
did not qualify for CAT protection because his fear of torture based on his sexuality was 
“speculative” and he did not provide evidence “establish[ing] that such torture would be 
committed by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.”  A.R. 79.  Bent 
appealed to the BIA.  
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s order and dismissed the appeal.  It agreed that Bent’s 
conspiracy to commit racketeering conviction constituted an aggravated felony and a 
particularly serious crime, rendering him ineligible for withholding of removal.  It also 
determined that Bent was not entitled to CAT protection because his fears were 
speculative.   
 Bent petitions for review. 
 
1 Bent also applied for asylum, but he was denied such relief and does not seek 
review of that ruling.  Even if he did, that argument would fail because, as explained 
herein, he was convicted of an aggravated felony and thus is statutorily ineligible for 





We have jurisdiction over final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  
With respect to orders removing aggravated felons, our jurisdiction is limited.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C); accord. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  In such cases, we have 
jurisdiction only to review “constitutional claims or questions of law,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D), and we review those claims de novo, Borrome v. Att’y Gen., 687 F.3d 
150, 154 (3d Cir. 2012).3  Therefore, we must first determine the scope of our 
jurisdiction, and that depends on whether Bent was convicted of an aggravated felony.     
 Bent’s offense of conviction constitutes an aggravated felony.  The term 
“aggravated felony” includes “an offense described in section 1962 of title 18 (relating to 
racketeer influenced corrupt organizations),” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(J), as well as “an 
attempt or conspiracy to commit” such an offense, id. § 1101(a)(43)(U).  Here, Bent 
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d),  
and was sentenced to two-years’ imprisonment.4  Accordingly, Bent’s crime of 
 
2 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15.   
3 “When, as here, the BIA affirms an IJ’s decision and adds analysis of its own, we 
review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.”  Lupera-Espinoza v. Att’y Gen., 716 F.3d 
781, 785 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).   
4 Bent’s judgment has a typographical error in the citation to his offense of 
conviction, citing to “21 U.S.C. 1962(d)” instead of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, but its description 
of the “Nature of Offense” as a “Racketeering Conspiracy,” A.R. 523, is correct.  This 
typographical error does not alter his crime of conviction.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(d) 
(explaining that an IJ may consider “any . . . evidence that reasonably indicates the 
existence of a criminal conviction”); cf. Dyab v. United States, 855 F.3d 919, 923 (8th 
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conviction matches a crime listed as an aggravated felony in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”).  Because the crime of conviction “qualifies as an aggravated 
felony on its face . . . there is no need to compare the elements of his conviction to the 
elements of a generic federal offense . . . to determine if [it] was [] an aggravated felony.”  
United States v. Gonzalez-Corn, 807 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2015).  Since Bent is an 
aggravated felon, our review of his challenge to the order denying him withholding of 
removal is limited to legal questions and constitutional claims.  Mirambeaux v. Att’y 
Gen., 977 F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 2020).   
B 
We have jurisdiction to review Bent’s argument that the IJ applied the incorrect 
legal standard to determine whether he was eligible for withholding of removal because it 
raises a legal question.  Grijalva Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 978 F.3d 860, 869 n.10 (3d Cir. 
2020).  The IJ concluded that Bent was ineligible for withholding of removal because his 
aggravated felony was a particularly serious crime.  An alien is ineligible for withholding 
of removal where he “committed a ‘particularly serious crime’ because, in such a case, 
the alien is considered a ‘danger to the community of the United States.’”  Flores v. Att’y 
Gen., 856 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii)).  An 
aggravated felony is presumptively a particularly serious crime where “the alien has been 
 
Cir. 2017) (noting, in the habeas context, that correcting “typographical errors . . . does 
not substantively alter” the judgment); United States v. Hyten, 5 F.3d 1154, 1155-57 & 
n.1 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming conviction where “the judgment contain[ed] a 
typographical error as to [the defendant’s] crime of conviction”). 
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sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B).  This presumption, however, “shall not preclude the Attorney General 
from determining that, notwithstanding the length of the sentence imposed, an alien has 
been convicted of a particularly serious crime.”  Id.  Thus, “[a]n IJ has broad discretion to 
determine whether a prior conviction is a particularly serious crime through a case-by-
case adjudication,” regardless of the sentence imposed.  Grijalva Martinez, 978 F.3d at 
870 (quotation marks and citations omitted).  To this end, the IJ may consider “such 
factors as [1] the nature of the conviction, [2] the circumstances and underlying facts of 
the conviction, [3] the type of sentence imposed, and, most importantly, [4] whether the 
type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the 
community.”  Luziga v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 244, 252 (3d Cir. 2019).    
Bent argues that the IJ and BIA erred as a matter of law because they considered 
evidence related to the full racketeering conspiracy, rather than just his role within it, 
which involved distribution of marijuana.  Because the IJ and BIA are not limited only to 
the elements of the crime to determine whether it is particularly serious, see Denis v. 
Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 215-17 & n.22 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that the BIA may 
consider “all reliable evidence” and is not confined to “the mere elements of an offense in 
finding a conviction particularly serious”), and may consider the nature and 
circumstances of the facts underlying the conviction, the IJ and BIA properly considered 
the illicit enterprise’s full scope, which included “narcotics trafficking, robbery, 
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attempted murder, and murder,” A.R. 533.5  Accordingly, the BIA and IJ did not apply an 
improper legal standard to determine whether Bent’s conviction was a particularly 
serious crime,6 and thus properly concluded he was not entitled to withholding of 
removal.   
C 
The scope of our jurisdiction to review rulings on CAT claims brought by 
aggravated felons is broader than that permitted for reviewing their withholding claims.  
Grijalva Martinez, 978 F.3d at 871 n.11.  With respect to CAT claims, we may review 
legal and constitutional claims de novo as well as factual challenges for substantial 
evidence.  See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692, 1694 (2020) (“[For] factual 
challenges to CAT orders . . . [t]he standard of review is the substantial-evidence 
 
5 Moreover, Bent’s participation in drug trafficking, standing alone, is 
presumptively a particularly serious crime.  See Lavira v. Att’y Gen., 478 F.3d 158, 161 
(3d Cir. 2007) (noting that drug trafficking crimes are presumptively particularly serious 
crimes, even when the sentence imposed is less than five years) (citing In re Y-L-, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 270, 276-77 (B.I.A. 2002)); Rendon v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 967, 976 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“[A]n aggravated felony containing a drug trafficking element is presumed to be a 
particularly serious crime which would make [the applicant] ineligible for withholding of 
removal.”). 
6 To the extent Bent challenges the IJ’s discretionary determination that his crime 
was particularly serious, we lack jurisdiction to review that finding.  See Chiao Fang Ku 
v. Att’y Gen., 912 F.3d 133, 144 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A]rguments such as that an [IJ] or the 
BIA incorrectly weighed evidence, failed to consider evidence or improperly weighed 
equitable factors are not questions of law under § 1252(a)(2)(D).” (quoting Jarbough v. 
Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007))); Bernard v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 1042, 1047 
(7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (concluding that “[a]ttempts . . . to recharacterize the 




standard.”); Denis, 633 F.3d at 205-06 (reviewing legal and constitutional claims de 
novo).  An “agency’s ‘findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator 
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’”  Nasrallah, 140 S. Ct. at 1692 (quoting 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). 
 An applicant for CAT relief must show “it is more likely than not that he or she 
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(c)(2).  For an act to constitute torture,  
it must be:  (1) an act causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering; 
(2) intentionally inflicted; (3) for an illicit or proscribed purpose; (4) by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who 
has custody or physical control of the victim; and (5) not arising from lawful 
sanctions. 
 
Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017).  Here, Bent presented country 
condition reports indicating that homosexual acts are illegal in Jamaica and that there 
have been instances of discrimination and violence against gay men.  These general 
reports, however, do not establish a threat of torture meriting CAT relief.  See Tarrawally 
v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that country condition reports 
were “insufficient to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that a particular civilian, 
in this case [the petitioner], will be tortured” if returned to his home country).  Bent did 
not provide any evidence of specific threats against him, arguing only that other 
Jamaicans he met while incarcerated in the United States used slurs against him when 
they found out he is gay.  Additionally, Bent failed to demonstrate that he would face 
torture with the consent or at the acquiescence of public officials.  Rather, the record 
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shows that the laws against homosexuality have only been enforced “in cases of sexual 
assault and child molestation,” A.R. 216, and that Jamaica’s police force has “adopted a 
Policy on Diversity, which includes guidelines on dealing with sexual minorities as a 
protected group,” A.R. 385.  There was therefore substantial evidence upon which the IJ 
and BIA could conclude that Bent was not entitled to CAT relief.  See Bernard v. 
Sessions, 881 F.3d 1042, 1048-49 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (collecting cases and 
concluding a petitioner was not entitled to CAT relief despite some evidence of violence 
against the LGBT community in Jamaica).7 
III 
 For these reasons, we will dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review. 
 
7 Bent also argues that the IJ and BIA violated his due process rights by 
disregarding evidence supporting his CAT claim.  Due process requires that aliens have 
“the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976), and this includes “the right to an individualized 
determination of his interests.”  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(quotation marks and citations omitted).  With respect to the right to an individualized 
determination, due process requires that the BIA and IJ “actually consider the evidence 
and argument that a party presents.”  Cham v. Att’y Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 693 (3d Cir. 
2006) (quoting Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 549).  The IJ and BIA met that standard here, as the 
record reflects both carefully examined the evidence, including the country condition 
reports. 
